Enriching Antiqua et Nova's Understanding of the Human Person
Cognitional Theory, Incarnate Personalism, and AI
Introduction
Antiqua et Nova (2025) is a recent Vatican document that reflects on the relationship between Artificial Intelligence (AI) and human intelligence. It emphasizes the gift of human intelligence as essential to the Imago Dei, urging an “integral vision of the human person” in addressing new technological challenges (Antiqua and Nova: Artificial and Human Intelligence « Catholic Insight). In this context, it becomes crucial to deepen our understanding of what human intelligence truly entails, beyond the capacities of machines. I was surprised to see that the insights of three of my favorite 20th-century thinkers – Bernard Lonergan, W. Norris Clarke, and Pope St. John Paul II – were not cited and have written the following to enrich the themes of Antiqua et Nova with their thought. Each of these thinkers, in different ways, explored human knowing, consciousness, and embodiment in light of classical wisdom and contemporary thought. By engaging their epistemologies and anthropologies, we can appreciate more fully the depth, structure, and incarnate character of human intelligence that distinguishes it from artificial computation. The following sections synthesize Lonergan’s cognitional theory, Clarke’s Thomistic personalism, and John Paul II’s personalist phenomenology, showing their relevance for the vision articulated in Antiqua et Nova.
Epistemology and Cognitional Theory
Bernard Lonergan: Insight as the Structure of Cognition
If you’ve read nearly anything I’ve written, you’ve heard me speak of Lonergan. For those of you who haven’t, he was a Canadian Jesuit philosopher-theologian who developed a profound theory of how humans know, most famously in his work Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. Lonergan argues that human knowing is not a single act but a dynamic structure of cognitional operations. He identifies distinct levels: experiencing (through the senses), understanding (insight), and judging (verification), with a fourth level of deciding (action) beyond knowing. No one level by itself constitutes knowing; instead, “one has to regard an instance of human knowing not as this or that operation, but as a whole whose parts are operations. It is a structure and, indeed, a materially dynamic structure” (Cognitional-Structure-Lonergan.pdf). In Lonergan’s view, knowledge begins with attentive experience – the data of sense and consciousness – which provokes questions that lead to insight. Insight is the pivotal act by which the intellect “grasps” an intelligible pattern or idea in the data. This understanding is then expressed in concepts and rigorously checked by reflection and judgment to ensure it actually corresponds to reality. Thus, knowing is self-transcending and cumulative: experience “stimulates inquiry,” inquiry leads to insight, insight is formulated and then criticized by reason until a true judgment is reached. Lonergan’s epistemology is a form of critical realism – it acknowledges the role of the knowing subject’s consciousness while affirming that through intelligent and rational inquiry we attain truth about real being. He describes the human mind as driven by an unrestricted desire to know, ultimately oriented toward being or reality itself. This orientation means our intellects are not satisfied with disconnected facts; we naturally seek coherent understanding and truth. In sum, Lonergan presents human intelligence as an insight-driven, structured process that is rational, self-correcting, and oriented toward reality. This account illuminates why human knowing has a depth that goes beyond mere data-processing: it involves a conscious striving for meaning and truth, something no algorithm can replicate in the same way.
W. Norris Clarke: Metaphysical Realism and Participatory Knowing
W. Norris Clarke, S.J. (1915–2008) was a Thomistic philosopher who developed an enriched metaphysical vision of the person and a robust realist epistemology. Clarke affirms the metaphysical realism of St. Thomas Aquinas: the world of beings is genuinely knowable, and the human intellect by its nature is orientated toward being. In his words, “the human intellect, in fact any intellect, is made for being” and has a natural affinity for reality (Explorations in Metaphysics: Being-God-Person on JSTOR). Knowing, for Clarke, is not constructing reality, but participating in the intelligibility that things already possess by virtue of their act of existence. Aquinas taught that to know a thing is to become, in a way, the thing known (the form of the object is received into the mind). Clarke builds on this, emphasizing that every real being is inherently active and self-communicative: to be is to express oneself, to act, and thus to be capable of being known (W. Norris Clarke. Person, Being, and St. Thomas. Communio 19 (Winter 1992).). If a being never interacted or manifested itself, “there would be no way for anything else to know that it exists”. Knowledge, then, happens in a dialogue between being and mind: the real object discloses itself (at least partially) through its activities and relationships, and the mind receives this intelligible form. Clarke often summarized this relational vision with the phrase “to be is to be substance-in-relation.” Even the knower is a substance-in-relation, needing openness to the other. He describes the intellect’s openness as a kind of receptivity to being. Rather than seeing knowing as a power that dominates, Clarke sees it as entering into communion with reality: “Receptivity to another being’s manifestation…enables us to enter into communion with other beings” (Getting Personal: The philosophy of W. Norris Clarke, S.J. | America Magazine). This participatory aspect means human knowing is a two-way relation – the world impresses itself on the mind, and the mind, by understanding, participates in the being of the other. Clarke’s epistemology remains thoroughly realist (truth is the mind conforming to reality), but it stresses the personal and relational dimension of knowing. Knowing is a meeting of being and intellect, ultimately grounded in God’s eternal knowledge. In sum, Clarke contributes a metaphysical depth to cognitional theory: human intelligence is a finite light ignited by the light of being itself, allowing us to share in the truth of what exists. This view underscores why human knowing cannot be reduced to mechanical processing – it involves a living mind in communion with the reality that only a being with intellect and appetite for truth can achieve.
John Paul II: Personalist Approach to Knowledge
Karol Wojtyła, who became Pope John Paul II (though I prefer, the Great) (1920–2005), brought a personalist and phenomenological perspective to questions of knowledge in his philosophical work (The Acting Person) and magisterial teaching (Fides et Ratio, 1998). John Paul II insists that all knowing is rooted in the subjectivity of the person and is oriented toward profound truths about reality and the human condition. In the encyclical Fides et Ratio, he famously wrote: “Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truth…so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves.” (Fides et Ratio (14 September 1998) | John Paul II). This statement encapsulates his personalist epistemology: the drive to know is part of our very nature and is linked with our desire for the infinite (ultimately, God). Knowing the truth is not merely an intellectual luxury but essential to realizing ourselves as persons. John Paul II emphasizes the integration of the knower and the known – as we come to know the world, we also come to know ourselves. “The more human beings know reality and the world, the more they know themselves in their uniqueness… All that is the object of our knowledge becomes a part of our life” (Fides et Ratio (14 September 1998) | John Paul II). In other words, knowledge has existential repercussions: it shapes who we are, not just what we possess. Wojtyła’s The Acting Person further develops a theory of consciousness and self-knowledge: human beings have not only intentional cognitive acts (knowing objects in the world), but also an inward awareness of self. He distinguishes between the intentional (object-directed) and experiential (self-reflective) dimensions of knowing (The Meaning of “Consciousness” in the Phenomenology of “The Acting Person” Wojtyla, (John Paul II) – The Truth Will Make You Free). Consciousness accompanies our acts and inner happenings, “mirroring” them, which means the person not only knows the world but also reflects on his own being and actions (The Meaning of “Consciousness” in the Phenomenology of “The Acting Person” Wojtyla, (John Paul II) – The Truth Will Make You Free). This reflexivity is a hallmark of personal intelligence – something absent in artificial systems. Furthermore, John Paul II’s personalism insists that truth has a moral dimension: seeking truth is a task for the whole person, requiring sincerity and responsibility. In Fides et Ratio he warned of the despair that comes when humans doubt their capacity for truth (Fides et Ratio (14 September 1998) | John Paul II). Instead, he argues, true freedom and personal fulfillment come from aligning one’s mind with truth and ultimately with God (Fides et Ratio (14 September 1998) | John Paul II). This approach highlights wisdom (deep understanding of ultimate causes and meaning) as the highest aim of human intelligence, as opposed to mere factual or technical knowledge. In summary, John Paul II views human knowing as the journey of the whole person toward truth – a journey that is intellectual, moral, and spiritual. This stands in contrast to machine “knowledge,” which has no inner life or moral purpose. His personalist epistemology ensures that we see intelligence in the context of the person who knows, loves, and acts.
Embodiedness and Human Intelligence
Lonergan: Consciousness and Embodiment
While Lonergan’s cognitional theory often focuses on interior logical structure, he is clear that human knowing is rooted in our embodied, conscious experience. The very first level of knowing – experience – consists of the data received through the senses, imagination, and attention. Lonergan affirms the classical principle nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu (nothing in the intellect without first being in the senses): “Without the prior presentations of sense, there is nothing for a man to understand; and when there is nothing to be understood, there is no occurrence of understanding” (Cognitional-Structure-Lonergan.pdf). In other words, our capacity for insight depends on the rich, textured input from our embodiment in a world. He delineates an empirical level of consciousness, which includes sensory perceptions, bodily feelings, and emergent images, as the foundation upon which intellectual inquiry builds (Cognitional-Structure-Lonergan.pdf). Far from being disembodied minds, we are incarnate subjects: our neural and sensory experiences condition what and how we can know. Lonergan’s later work (e.g. Method in Theology) explicitly speaks of the human subject as an embodied consciousness existing within biological, social, and historical contexts. He acknowledges, for example, that our knowing has biological roots (patterned by our sensorimotor schemes and neural processes) and that the pure desire to know is carried in a psyche which is part of our organic nature. Thus, human intelligence does not float free of the body – it emerges from the integration of sensory experience, attentive consciousness, and intellectual operation. Moreover, Lonergan clarifies the role of consciousness: it is the interior awareness we have of the flow of our cognitional activities (experiencing, understanding, judging, etc.). This consciousness is itself a kind of experiential given – we don’t have to perform an extra act to have it; it’s the background light accompanying all our knowing acts (Cognitional-Structure-Lonergan.pdf). He distinguishes consciousness from explicit self-knowledge: we are consciously aware of our acts, and then on reflection we can make that awareness itself an object of inquiry (knowing knowing). So, consciousness is the embodied subjectivity ever-present in our knowing. It ties our mental acts to the here-and-now of the individual person. For Lonergan, then, human intelligence is embodied, dynamic, conscious, and active. Our rational self-transcendence (going beyond ourselves to truth) is achieved through the resources of our embodied existence – our senses, language, culture, and community. This underscores one reason why artificial intelligence differs: AI may simulate certain logical patterns, but it does not arise from a unified conscious subject that senses and strives; it has no lived body, no consciousness, and no driven desire for meaning. Lonergan’s account thus highlights the incarnational aspect of human intelligence – appropriate for a theological context that sees humans as body-soul unities, made in the image of the Incarnate Word.
Clarke: Thomistic Relationality and Embodiment
As a Thomistic metaphysician, Norris Clarke views the human person as a body–soul composite, an “embodied spirit.” He follows Aquinas in teaching that the soul is the form of the body – together they constitute one substance (not a soul trapped in a body, but a single unified being). “The human being is a unified substance of body and rational soul. As a unified substance, the human person is both in-itself and toward-others”. In this understanding, our bodily dimension is not an add-on but an essential aspect of our personhood and mode of intelligence. Clarke was critical of any Cartesian tendencies to split the person; instead, he presents a harmonious vision in which our material, sensible experiences cooperate with our intellectual and spiritual operations. Because we are embodied, all our knowledge begins in sensory intuition of concrete, singular reality. Aquinas and Clarke emphasize that intellectual knowledge rises from the phantasm – i.e., the mental image derived from sense experience – which the active intellect then illuminates to abstract an intelligible form. This means human intelligence always remains connected to the material world through the mediation of the body. Clarke’s hallmark idea of “substance-in-relation” also has implications for embodiment: Our body situates us in a network of relationships with the material cosmos and with other embodied persons. The body is what allows us to act on and be affected by others – it is through bodily actions, sense perceptions, and communication (speech, gesture, art) that persons reveal themselves. Indeed, Clarke sees all being as self-expressive action; in humans, the body is the primary locus of that expression. Far from viewing the body as a prison of the soul, Clarke views it as the enabling medium for the soul’s self-communication and for interpersonal communion. He would agree with the Christian personalist insight that our bodiliness allows us to give and receive love in visible ways (a point convergent with John Paul II’s thought, below). Importantly, embodiment in Clarke’s Thomistic realism also means limits and particularity: each human intellect is finite, located here and now, and must gather knowledge piece by piece. This stands in contrast to disembodied angels (or hypothetical AI super-intelligences) that might perceive wholes instantly – humans must work through the body, gradually and discursively. Yet Clarke sees a positive value in this: our embodied state makes us participants in the material universe and “co-creators” under God’s providence, imbuing even our intellectual life with a communal, historical character. In short, Clarke’s view of human intelligence is thoroughly incarnate: the human person is an embodied knower whose rational soul works in unity with the body. Any account of intelligence that neglects the body (as merely a support system or irrelevant) would, for Clarke, miss the full reality of the human person. This perspective deepens the appreciation in Antiqua et Nova that human intelligence cannot be replicated by machines precisely because machines lack life, sensation, and the real being-in-the-world that human embodied spirits possess.
John Paul II: Phenomenology of the Body
No one has articulated the significance of the human body for personhood more powerfully than John Paul II, especially in his Theology of the Body (a series of addresses from 1979–1984). Drawing from Scripture and phenomenology, he proposes that the human body reveals fundamental truths about the person. One of his striking claims is that “the body, and it alone, is capable of making visible what is invisible: the spiritual and the divine.” (Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, Pauline Books & Media; 2nd Edition (July 31, 2006)) In other words, our bodily reality is sacramental – it expresses the soul, the person, and even reflects God’s image. For John Paul II, embodiedness is not a hindrance to intelligence or spirituality, but the very means by which personal meaning is communicated. This “phenomenology of the body” begins with the experience that we do not just have bodies, we are our bodies. In all human knowing, the body plays a role: our eyes see, our brains process, our hands write, and even abstract thought relies on the embodied imagination and language centers of the brain. But beyond these biological functions, John Paul II emphasizes the personal meaning of the body. For instance, in the context of man and woman (“male and female he created them”), the body discloses a call to interpersonal communion – a nuptial meaning. More generally, the body is how the person manifests themselves to others. Every act of knowledge or love by a human is done in and through the body: a smile, a spoken word, an embrace, or even the attentive gaze at a book all involve the body as interface of the person with the world. John Paul II’s The Acting Person also contributes here: he notes that in action, the “lived body” (corpus vivum) is the executive subject of our deeds, and our self-awareness is inherently awareness as embodied. He delves into how we experience ourselves through conscious bodily activity and how moral virtue is inscribed in the “bodily” level of habit. Thus, human intelligence is intrinsically embodied and enacted – it lives in the acting person, not in an abstract Cartesian mind. This has crucial implications: Our rationality is intertwined with affectivity (feelings, emotions) and with the social context (we learn and communicate in community through bodily media). John Paul II would argue that a disembodied intelligence is an impoverished one; indeed, one of his concerns about technology is that it can tempt us to value virtual or mechanical processes over the richer reality of human interaction. His Theology of the Body underscores that even the highest spiritual truths (like divine love) needed the Incarnation – God taking a human body – to be fully revealed to us. By extension, any proper understanding of human intelligence must include the fact that we are incarnate minds. This perspective reinforces Antiqua et Nova’s point that human intelligence carries a dignity and depth rooted in the spiritual soul, but also that it operates within our bodily, earthly existence. It is the unity of the two – our being corpore et anima unus (body and soul as one) – that makes our intelligence personal and moral. No AI, which lacks a personal body-soul unity, can replicate this dimension of meaning. John Paul II thus offers a vision of the body as integral to the human person, ensuring that any discussion of “intelligence” keeps in view the whole person: body, mind, and spirit.
Synthesis and Contribution to Antiqua et Nova
Each of these thinkers – Lonergan, Clarke, and John Paul II – brings out aspects of human intelligence that richly complement the vision of Antiqua et Nova. That Vatican document distinguishes AI’s computational abilities from human intelligence, which it frames within the imago Dei, ethical responsibility, and an integral humanism. By synthesizing insights from our three authors, we can better articulate why human intelligence is unique and how to uphold its dignity in the face of advancing AI:
A Fuller Notion of Knowing: Lonergan contributes a detailed account of the interior structure of human cognition. This helps clarify that human knowing is far more than data processing or pattern recognition (which AI excels at) – it is a self-correcting quest for understanding and truth. Lonergan shows that genuine insight is something spontaneous and contextual, arising from the conscious wonder of a subject confronting mystery. AI can simulate logical steps, but it does not truly understand; it has no “aha!” moments of insight or rational judgments guided by a desire for truth. Thus, Antiqua et Nova’s call for an integral vision is enriched by Lonergan’s description of humans as intelligent, rational, and responsible – capable of reflecting on their own thinking and aiming at truth and value, not just outputting probabilities. This reinforces the document’s caution that imitation of human intelligence by machines does not equal duplication of the real thing.
Metaphysical and Existential Depth: Clarke’s perspective roots human intelligence in the very fabric of reality (being) and highlights its participatory character. This adds a metaphysical dimension to Antiqua et Nova’s primarily ethical and anthropological focus. If, as Clarke says, the intellect is ordered toward the whole of being, then human intelligence has an openness to infinite truth and being (ultimately God) that no finite algorithm can have. It also means that human knowing carries a spiritual character – it is a created participation in God’s own light. Antiqua et Nova notes that human creativity and abilities come from God and reflect his wisdom (Antiqua and Nova: Artificial and Human Intelligence « Catholic Insight); Clarke’s thought undergirds this by showing philosophically how every act of understanding is grounded in the active presence of being (which comes from God). Moreover, Clarke’s insistence on the relational nature of persons aligns with the document’s emphasis on using intelligence for the common good and in stewardship, not in isolation (Antiqua and Nova: Artificial and Human Intelligence « Catholic Insight). Human intelligence, properly understood, is never a mere individual property or neutral tool – it connects us to others, to the world, and to the Source of all intelligibility. This understanding supports Antiqua et Nova’s guidance that AI development must uphold human dignity and relationality (Antiqua and Nova: Artificial and Human Intelligence « Catholic Insight), because human intelligence itself flourishes in relationship (with other minds, with creation, with God).
Personalist and Embodied Context: John Paul II’s contributions ensure that our understanding of intelligence remains holistic and personal. Antiqua et Nova stresses an “integral vision of the human person” – John Paul II provides exactly that, weaving together the intellectual, moral, and bodily dimensions. From him we learn that human intelligence cannot be divorced from the freedom and responsibility of the person. In practical terms, this means that technology (like AI) should always be evaluated by how it serves the human person’s authentic good. John Paul II would remind us that an increase in computational power does not necessarily equate to true wisdom or fulfillment. His Fides et Ratio teaches that humans seek not just facts but meaning and ultimately a relationship with Truth itself (God) (Fides et Ratio (14 September 1998) | John Paul II). In the context of AI, this implies that no matter how “smart” machines become, the human vocation to seek ultimate truth and meaning remains distinct. Additionally, JP2’s emphasis on the body (as seen in his Theology of the Body) adds a critical insight: human intelligence operates within our living, conscious bodies and is therefore tied to our vulnerability, emotions, and social communion. Antiqua et Nova implicitly relies on this when it points out ethical issues like AI possibly reducing persons to data points or making decisions detached from human empathy. By recalling John Paul II’s phenomenology of the body, we reinforce that ethical intelligence requires the human qualities of empathy, conscience, and love – qualities that arise from our embodied personal nature, not from computing power.
In theological perspective, these three thinkers collectively affirm a truth that complements Revelation: human intelligence is a God-given light, reflecting the divine Logos. Lonergan speaks of the “transcendental notions” of intelligibility, truth, goodness – which in Christian terms derive from God as Supreme Truth and Good. Clarke’s metaphysics sees every intellect as oriented to Being Itself (God) and every act of understanding as a small participation in God’s knowing. John Paul II explicitly links our rational nature to the image of God and insists that faith and reason work together for us to attain the fullness of truth. (Fides et Ratio (14 September 1998) | John Paul II) All this converges with Antiqua et Nova’s theological anthropology, which grounds human dignity in being created imago Dei. It implies that artificial intelligence, however advanced, remains a product of human ingenuity and not a bearer of the imago Dei. Therefore, it must always be kept subordinate to human values and needs. Our synthesis also highlights that human intelligence has a moral dimension: Lonergan speaks of the level of deliberation and responsible decision after knowing, John Paul II of the moral conscience and the drama of freedom. Antiqua et Nova takes up this theme by offering ethical guidelines for AI. The philosophical insights here deepen that foundation, showing that intelligence severed from ethics is a distortion. A machine might calculate, but it will not stop itself from immoral use – only human beings can guide the use of intelligence with wisdom and moral insight.
The contributions of Lonergan, Clarke, and John Paul II thus enrich Antiqua et Nova by providing an explanatory definition of human intelligence: as cognitional structure (oriented to truth), as participation in being (open to communion), and as personal, embodied consciousness (oriented to meaningful relationships and moral good). This synthesis supports the document’s core message that human intelligence, with its ancient origin and ever-new applications, must be understood in light of the fullness of the human person. It cautions us, in line with the Vatican document, that reducing intelligence to its technical aspects (as AI research might) fails to do justice to the human reality – a reality that integrates mind, body, and spirit in the pursuit of truth and love.
Conclusion
In summary, the exploration of Bernard Lonergan, W. Norris Clarke, and John Paul II provides profound insights into human intelligence that reinforce and deepen the themes of Antiqua et Nova. We have seen that human knowing is not a flat, algorithmic activity, but a rich, structured process of experiencing, understanding, and judging (Lonergan); that it places us in contact with all of reality and is fundamentally oriented toward being and truth (Clarke); and that it is inextricably bound up with our existence as embodied persons who seek meaning, goodness, and relationship (John Paul II). Human intelligence carries within it the stamp of its divine origin – our intellects are capax Dei (capable of God), desiring absolute truth – and the mark of our humble condition – we learn step by step within a body and community. This synthesis underscores the dignity of human intelligence: it is something interiorly dynamic, spiritually open, and communally situated, far beyond the capacities of any artificial construct that lacks soul and self-awareness.
Looking ahead, several future directions emerge for integrating these perspectives in contemporary philosophy and theology:
Interdisciplinary Dialogue: The insights of Lonergan, Clarke, and John Paul II can dialogue with cognitive science, AI research, and neuroscience to foster a more holistic understanding of intelligence. Such a dialogue could help ensure technological progress respects the qualitative uniqueness of human cognition and consciousness, as highlighted by these thinkers.
Ethics and AI Policy: Bringing this enriched anthropology into discussions of AI ethics can guide policies that safeguard human dignity. For example, recognizing the personalist dimensions of intelligence might influence how we design AI to assist (not replace) human decision-making, emphasizing transparency, responsibility, and the irreplaceable role of human judgment and empathy.
Theological Development: In theology, these perspectives support a renewed emphasis on the Imago Dei as related to human intellect and freedom. This could deepen Christian teaching on issues ranging from transhumanism to education. The idea of intelligence as a participation in the divine light might also be explored in dialogue with the doctrine of grace – how human creativity with AI might be enfolded into God’s creative plan without compromising what is uniquely human.
In conclusion, the ancient wisdom recovered by Lonergan’s cognitional theory and Clarke’s Thomistic personalism, combined with the modern personalism of John Paul II, indeed exemplify “wisdom both old and new” (antiqua et nova) for our age. They remind us that however sophisticated our machines become, human intelligence remains a unique gift – a locus of mystery, insight, moral agency, and transcendent orientation. By understanding this gift more fully, we are better equipped to use our technologies ethically and to cultivate the true flourishing of the human person in the image of God.